If one tried to advance theses in philosophy, it would never be possible to debate them…

In his posthumous publication, Wittgenstein says (in PI section 128) that If one tried to advance theses in philosophy, it would never be possible to debate them, because everyone would agree to them.

“At the end of the summer vacation of 1911 Wittgenstein, having drawn up a plan of his projected book on philosophy, travelled to Jena to discuss it with Frege — presumably whit a view to finding out whether it worth going on with, or whether he should instead continue with his work in aeronautical research. ” In Chapter 3, Russell’s Protege, Ray Monk started with this description about Wittgenstein. (Page 36 of Ludwig Wittgenstein, the Duty of Genius)

Both Frege and Russell are inspirational to Wittgenstein’s projected book on philosophy in 1911. Seven years later, the project was done satisfactorily as Wittgenstein wrote in his preface: “...the truth of the thoughts communicated here seems to me unassailable and definitive. I am therefore of the opinion that the problems have in essentials been finally solved.”

To give the credits to Frege and Russell Wittgenstein wrote: “I will only mention that to the great works of Frege and the writings of my friend Bertrand Russell I owe in large measure the stimulation of my thoughts.”

In my opinion, his seven-year labor of thought processing and philosophizing the world he lived in, his only philosophy publication in book, Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus is invaluable in philosophy compared with the works done by Russell and Frege combined. It was a trail blazing in philosophy as of 1921, its publication date, it still is for the many have not realized its significance in the world we live in now.

To Wittgenstein Tractatus Logico-Philosophicu has shown, as he modestly said in his preface, “how little has been done when these problems have been solved.” To me, it is a small step in metaphysics, it is a giant step in philosophy, therefore, in human knowledge, and in human progress. I have been reading the book and writing about my understanding ever since June, 2021. To understand what I am saying, please read my articles. Thank you.

视而不见 听而不闻 is not about See No Evil, Hear No Evil.

See No Evil, Hear No Evil is a 1989 American comedy film directed by Arthur Hiller. The film stars Richard Pryor as a blind man and Gene Wilder as a deaf man who work together to thwart a trio of murderous thieves. Both blindness and hearing loss are physical disabilities of the two main characters of the film.

视而不见 听而不闻 is a Chinese idiom that could be translated into “turn a blind eye, hear but not hear.” It is nothing to do with physical disability as the movie See No Evil, Hear No Evil portrays. It has the meaning that can be identified in the sentences that I quote here: Philosophy simply puts everything before us, and neither explains nor deduces anything.—Since everything lies open to view there is nothing to explain. For what is hidden, for example, is of no interest to us. (Wittgenstein, section 126, Philosophical Investigations)

Although we have perfect vision and hearing, when we are not interested in certain things, we see nothing, we hear nothing, we don’t think about what might be sensed at the moment at all. Consequently, there is no philosophizing activity in our head. Wittgenstein continues the train of the thought: One might also give the name “philosophy” to what is possible before all new discoveries and inventions.

Philosophizing is innate in human nature. Some people are seen to be argumentative because these individuals have strong instinct in philosophizing everything that can stimulate their vision and hearing, therefore, thinking about these stimuli. They actually talk about it if they have seen a new aspect as it has never been known to them. That is part of new discoveries and inventions in Wittgenstein’s thought described in section 126 of Philosophical Investigations.

In his Tractatus 6.53 he says, The right method of philosophy would be this: To say nothing except what can be said, i.e. the propositions of natural science, i.e. something that has nothing to do with philosophy: and then always, when someone else wished to say something metaphysical, to demonstrate to him that he had given no meaning to certain signs in his propositions. This method would be unsatisfying to the other—he would not have the feeling that we were teaching him philosophy—but it would be the only strictly correct method.

Did he fail to adhere to this method in his Tractatus, as it has been described by Ray Monk’s Ludwig Wittgenstein, the Duty of Genius? (on Page 296) It is to me a Monk’s misunderstanding of Wittgenstein. It shows me how Wittgenstein foot noting the Tractatus 6.53 with the section 126 of Philosophical Investigations after he was often questioned by his friends about the method in Tractatus 6.53. Wittgenstein is polite explaining that one doesn’t get it because one has no interest in it. It is not quite right as I see it. It might be said that one has been preoccupied with one’s own idea and having a blind eye onto Wittgenstein’s idea. It might also be explained that thinking has depth, and that a person needs constant development in his thinking. Processing thoughts are difficult and requiring flexible and open minds.

What cannot be said in propositions can be shown.

The title of the article, a proposition, has been said by Wittgenstein in his Tractatus, a seven-year labor of inquisitive effort done in 1918. The well-known Cambridge professor, a mathematician and philosopher, Bertrand Russell, being Wittgenstein’s inspiration of the book Tractatus Logico-Philosopicus, and his early mentor believed that the proposition/doctrine was a mistake.

Let’s analyze it to see whether it is a mistake or not.

In Tractatus 6.3, Wittgenstein says: Logical research means the investigation of all regularity. And outside logic all is accident. He continues from the train of thoughts: The so-called law of induction cannot in any case be a logical law, for it is obviously a significant proposition. — Therefore, it cannot be a law a priri either. He explains: “Law of Causality” is a class name. And as in mechanics there are, for instance, minimum-laws, such as that of least actions, so in physics there are causal laws, laws of the causality form. (T6.321) Men had indeed an idea that there must be a “law of least action”, before they knew exactly how it ran. (Here, as always, the a priori certain proves to be something purely logical.) (T6.3211)

Wittgenstein goes on analyzing the law of conservation in his Tractatus 6.33: We do not believe a priori in a law of conservation, but we know a priori the possibility of a logical form.

He summarizes in Tractatus 6.34: All propositions, such as the law of causation, the law of continuity in nature, the law of least expenditure in nature, etc. etc., all these are a priori intuitions of possible forms of the propositions of science.

In Tractatus 6.36, Wittgenstein writes the most important propositions leading to his doctrine: If there were a law of causality, it might run: “There are natural laws.” But that can clearly not be said: it shows itself.

Tractatus 6.36 paves the road to his genius observation: A necessity for one thing to happen because another has happened does not exist. There is only logical necessity. (T6.37) He gives an example with a clever analogy: At the basis of the whole modern view of the world lies the illusion, that the so called laws of nature are the explanations of natural phenomena. (T6.371) So people stop short at natural laws as something unassailable, as did the ancients at God and Fate. And they are both right and wrong, but the ancients were clearer, in so far as they recognized one clear terminus, whereas the modern system makes it appear as though everything were explained. (T6.372) As there is only a logical necessity, so there is only a logical impossibility. (T6.375) Therefore, there is no connection between world and human will. the world is independent of individual wills, unlike those individuals in fairytale, such as King Arthur, who stopped flood, believe it or not.

Now, we can look at Wittgenstein doctrine in Tractatus 6.4: All propositions are of equal value. Propositions cannot express anything higher. It is clear that ethics cannot be expressed. Ethics is transcendental. (Ethics and aesthetics are one.) (T6.421)

Tractatus 6.421 leads to Tractatus 6.5: For an answer which cannot be expressed the question too cannot be expressed. …If a question can be put at all, then it can also be answered. He explains further: Skepticism is not irrefutable, but palpably senseless, if it would doubt where a question cannot be asked. for doubt can only exist where there is a question; a question only where there is an answer, and this only where something can be said. (T6.51)

In Tractatus 6.52, Wittgenstein says: We feel that even if all possible scientific questions be answered, the problems of life have still not been touched at all. Of course there is then no question left, and just this is the answer. The solution of the problem of life is seen in the vanishing of this problem. (T6.521)

How clever!

Showing what is mystical, Wittgenstein says: Not how the world is , is the mystical, but that it is.(T6.44) The feeling that the world is a limited whole is the mystical feeling. (T6.45) And then, he continues in Tractatus 6.522: There is indeed the inexpressible. This shows itself; it is the mystical.

Unwilling to break Wittgenstein’s train of thoughts, I will quote his Tractatus 6.53: The right method of philosophy would be this: To say nothing except what can be said, i.e. the propositions of natural science, i.e. something that has nothing to do with philosophy: and then always, when someone else wished to say something metaphysical, to demonstrate to him that he had given no meaning to certain signs in his propositions. This method would be unsatisfying to the other—he would not have the feeling that we were teaching him philosophy—but it would be the only strictly correct method.

To persuade we argue

In his posthumous publication, Wittgenstein says (in PI section 122) that a main source of our failure to understand is that we do not command a clear view of the use of our words.—Our grammar is lacking in this sort of perspicuity.

Is it not a core observation? People are different in their natural quality. With different growing up environment, individual natural quality can be stretched even more, especially, when everyone has built up their own experience. Natural language is developed to accommodate the differences among people. Clarity is viewed only by those who understand thoughts of its speaker or writer. Understanding is the key within human quality.

In PI section 133, Wittgenstein says that it is not our aim to refine or complete the system of rules for the use of our words in unheard-of ways.

For the clarity that we are aiming at is indeed complete clarity. But this simply means that the philosophical problems should completely disappear.

The real discovery is the one that makes me capable of stopping doing philosophy when I want to.—The one that gives philosophy peace, so that it is no longer tormented by questions which bring itself in question.—Instead, we now demonstrate a method, by examples; and the series of examples can be broken off.—Problems are solved (difficulties eliminated), not a single problem.

There is not a philosophical method, though there are indeed methods, like different therapies.

Philosophy is collection of thoughts that are resulted in thinking and retrospection of what happened, what are concerns, and how to solve them if possible.

Whenever person’s thoughts in writing is perfectly clear to another person, a reader, the reader does not demand the thoughts to be argued with a clear ground to follow. Arguing is only to persuade in order to let audience understand writing like its writer.

Wittgenstein says in section 130 that our clear and simple language-games are not preparatory studies for a future regularization of language—as it were first approximations, ignoring friction and air-resistance. The language-games are rather set up as objects of comparison which are meant to throw light on the facts of our language by way not only of similarities, but also of dissimilarities.

This was further explained in PI section 132 that we want to establish an order in our knowledge of the use of language: an order with a particular end in view; one out of many possible orders; not the order. To this end we shall constantly be giving prominence to distinctions which our ordinary forms of language easily make us overlook. This may make it look as if we saw it as our task to reform language.

Persuasions by arguing or reforming language rules, neither can ensure the language clarity or communicate thoughts perfectly. Language communicates thoughts, however, understanding is a priori, i.e., metaphysical.

Things, cases, and facts

In his posthumous publication, Wittgenstein describes things as follows:

The aspects of things that are most important for us are hidden because of their simplicity and familiarity. (One is unable to notice something—because it is always before one’s eyes.) The real foundations of his inquiry do not strike a man at all. Unless that fact has at some time struck him.—And this means: we fail to be struck by what, once seen, is most striking and most powerful.

(Philosophical Investigations, section 129)

Clearly to me, this paragraph is the footnote of his chapter one of Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus. (1922, Ogden’s translation) Things are different from cases and facts. Cases and facts are those Wittgenstein meant that, once seen, is most striking and most powerful. The facts in logical space are the world. (T1.13) Once he has figured out the differences among things, cases, and facts, he ends the chapter with the following: The world divides into facts. (T1.2) Any one can either be be the case or not be the case, and everything else remain the same. (T1.21)

Chapter one of Tractatus paves the way to Wittgenstein’s solving the philosophical problem. Although he notices his solution to be little compared with problems to be solved in his preface, he makes a giant step in human understanding of the world and philosophical problems discussed among professional philosophers at his time.

Many philosophers in his time questioned the description in his preface: … the truth of the thoughts communicated here seems to me unassailable and definitive.

I believe that it is truth, like gravity; nobody denies the truth in 2022 anymore.

Reading Ray Monk’s Ludwig Wittgenstein, I learnt the confusion of Frege’s question to Wittgenstein upon reading his manuscript of Tractatus, I was shocked by Frege’s response. I quote below:

Right at the beginning I come across the expressions ‘is the case’ and ‘fact’ and I suspect that is the case and is a fact are the same. The world is everything that is the case and the world is the collection of facts. Is not every fact the case and is not that which is the case a fact? Why then this double expression? … Now comes a third expression: ‘What is the case, a fact, is the existence of Sachverhalte.’ I take this to mean that every fact is the existence of a Sachverhalt, so that another fact is the existence of another Sachverhalt. Couldn’t one delete the words ‘existence of’ and say ‘Every fact is a Sachverhalt, every other fact is anther Sachverhalt’ Could one perhaps also say ‘Every Sachverhalt is the existence of a fact?’

Ludwig Wittgenstein, 1990, page 163

Frege’s question was not his understanding of German language but his understanding of Wittgenstein’s thoughts. In Ogden’s translation, What is the case, the fact, is the existence of atomic facts. (T2) An atomic fact is a combination of objects (entities, things). (T2.01)

In my article written on Feb. 1, 2021, I have used Newtonian Gravity as an example to show a priori truth, indeed, it can also be called an atomic fact. The truth is that a fact can be an existence of an atomic fact, in which many facts can be listed depending our view points.

Philosophy and Language

In his Philosophical Investigations, Wittgenstein wrote:

It is the business of philosophy, not to resolve a contradiction by means of a mathematical or logico-mathematical discovery, but to make it possible for us to get a clear view of the state of mathematics that troubles us: the state of affairs before the contradiction is resolved. (And this does not mean that one is sidestepping a difficulty.)

The fundamental fact here is that we lay down rules, a technique, for a game, and that then when we follow the rules, things do not turn out as we had assumed. That we are therefore as it were entangled in our own rules.

This entanglement in our rules is what we want to understand (i.e. get a clear view of).

It throws light on our concept of meaning something. For in those cases things turn out otherwise than we had meant, foreseen. That is just what we say when, for example, a contradiction appears: “I didn’t mean it like that.”

The civil status of a contradiction, or its status in civil life: there is the philosophical problem.

PI, session 125

Unlike his aphoristic writing in Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, Wittgenstein’ posthumous publican, Philosophical Investigations, is his attempt to address right questions in every day use of language. The reason of not having it to be published, is that, as I have written in my article published on Oct. 21, 2022,

His preface was dated in 1945, after his struggling to meet “the thoughts should proceed from one subject to another in a natural order and without breaks”, which was his baseline criterion, he gave up publishing the book, Philosophical Investigations.
No body has doubted about his efforts and in so far no body has presented the subjects according to the baseline criterion in my opinion, not yet. 

I was talking about his baseline criterion, which was done in his Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus. I think that his mistake of not publishing it came from his inability to pursued Bertrand Russell and Frank Ramsey with his answers to their questions, or helping them to understand his Tractatus in his point of views.

In my opinion, Tractatus is an excellent presentation of his philosophical view of problems in the world via language expression or subjects not to be expressed in language, therefore, better of keeping silences and showing via actions.

His notion of atomic facts is clearly defined and occurred/not occurred conditionally and logically. This is coherently with his observation expressed in Tractatus 6.371 and 6.372. At the basis of the whole modern view of the world lies the illusion that the so called laws of nature are the explanations of natural phenomena. So people stop short at natural laws as something unassailable, as did the ancients at God and Fate. They are both right and wrong but the ancients were clearer, in so far as they recognized one clear terminus, whereas the modern system makes it appear as though everything were explained.

He then concluded that The world is independent of my will. (T6.373) This conclusion can be paired with the following concept, The limits of my language mean the limits of my world. (T5.6) and The world and life are one. (T5.621) I must add that he is using Philosophical I here.

His ideas here originally stimulated from his observation while enlisting as a volunteer in the army of Austro-Hungarian military. According to his biographer, Ray Monk, Wittgenstein kept his note then with the following: The people around me are not so much mean as appallingly limited. This makes it almost impossible to work with them, because they forever misunderstand. These people are not stupid, but limited. (Ludwig Wittgenstein, The Duty of Genius, 1990, page 139) These ideas are different from solipsism, stated in his Tractatus 5.62.

Asking right questions

Wittgenstein started with asking “what is logic?” after reading Bertrand Russell’s Principles Mathematics (1903) and Frege’s works on Logic. Not convinced by their mathematical prescriptions of logic in either the subject-predicate form or symbolic/mathematical logic, Wittgenstein worked hard to figure it out. With a coherent answer, he wrote Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus. (1918)

Logic in a sentence can be judged in true or false. The propositions of logic are tautology.

A sentence is clear if logic in the sentence is clear. If a question is answerable, the sentences to answer the question can be clear.

If the question is logical, the answer to it can be yes/true, no/false, or I don’t know (i.e., there is not enough data/measurements to judge.)

According to Wittgenstein’s biographer, Ray Monk, (Ludwig Wittgenstein, The duty of Genius, 1990) this breakthrough was done in October, 1914.

Wittgenstein call this breakthrough, Theory of Logical Portrayal. He differentiates propositions and cases/the state of affairs in language sentences such as the following example of grass in sentences: “the grass is green,” and “the grass being green.”

Therefore, it results in the chapter one of Tractatus.

The world is everything that is the case. <1>

The world is the totality of facts, not of things. <1.1> The world is determined by the facts and by these being all the facts. <1.11> For the totality of facts determines both what is the case, and also all that is not the case. <1.12> The facts in logical space are the world. <1.13, the end of 1.1>

The world divides into facts. <1.2> And one can either be the case or not be the case, and everything else remain the same. <1.21, the end of chapter one>

Note that things are naturally described in language.

Cases are naturally described in language and also called the state of affairs.

Facts are naturally occurred true/false things. If facts can be said clearly, it can be said, the opposite of saying is showing, which can only be shown but not said.

Ethics and Aesthetic are the latter, which can only be shown.

Ray Monk understands the important breakthrough of Wittgenstein’s seven-year endeavor writing his Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus. However, he wants to understanding the metaphysics of Wittgenstein’s thinking process and trying to trace his reading of Schopenhauer (1788-1860) and William James (1842-1910).

Through reading, Wittgenstein takes right questions and concerns, which stimulated Wittgenstein’s thinking and gave the rise of the final answers in his Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus.

Thanks to Mr. Monk’s biography about Wittgenstein, I am able to explain the myths provided by those who did not understand Tractatus, such as Russell and Frege at the beginning, nonetheless, had given valuable or right questions to encourage Wittgenstein to work on answering them.

Wittgenstein’s view of P. Coffey’s textbook on Logic

According to Ray Monk, the author of Wittgenstein’s biography, Wittgenstein was asked to review a textbook on logic, The Science of Logic for the Cambridge Review. Wittgenstein did it, which was the only published book review by Wittgenstein.

In Monk’s words I quote here:

The author’s Logic is that of the scholastic philosophers and he makes all their mistakes — of course with the usual references to Aristotle. (Aristotle, whose name is so much taken in vain by our logicians, would turn in his grave if he knew that so many Logicians know no more about Logic today than he did 2,000 years ago.) The author has not taken the slightest notice of the great work of the modern mathematical logicians –work which has brought about an advance in Logic comparable only to that which made Astronomy out of Astrology, and Chemistry out of Alchemy. (Ray Monk’s Ludwig Wittgenstein, Page 74)

Consequently, Monk provided mistakes pointed out by Wittgenstein. For example, the weaknesses of traditional (Aristotelian) logic customarily pointed out by adherents of Russellian mathematical logic, such as the following: it assumes all propositions to be of the subject-predicate form, that it confuses the two meanings of “is”, either when “is” is in Socrates is mortal, or when “is” is in Twice two is four. Wittgenstein ended his review with the following words: The worst of such books as this is that they prejudice sensible people against the study of Logic. (Ray Monk’s Ludwig Wittgenstein, Page 75)

Precisely, as I understand, Wittgenstein had described what I felt when I was in my graduate study learning Logic, Russellian Logic. Perhaps, the textbook that taught me Logic is still going on. Reading Wittgenstein’s Tractatus I have resonated with Wittgenstein and recalled my feeling about studying propositional logic and predict logic. They are not very practical to say the least.

Russell made some progress in studying Logic compared with Aristotlian Logic. He confessed by saying:

…it’s long been one of my dreams to found a great school of mathematically minded philosophers, but I don’t know whether I shall ever get it accomplished. I had hopes of Norton, but he has not the physique, Broad is all right, but has no fundamental originality. Wittgenstein of course is exactly my dream. (December, 1912, in his letter to Ottoline)

Reading Monk’s gory details on the straggling of Wittgenstein about the concept, Logic, I admired even more to the end product of his seven-year-effort, Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus.

Great and creative works never come easily, after all.

Reading

“Why did Wittgenstein admire the book so much? What did he learn from it? Indeed, given that its claims to scientific biology are transparently spurious, its epistemology obvious nonsense, its psychology primitive, and its ethical prescriptions odious, what could he possibly have learnt from it?”

Above quote is from Ray Monk’s Ludwig Wittgenstein, the Duty of Genius (1991) chapter one, page 23. While I am preparing to write a book about Wittgenstein, call it the Myth about Wittgenstein, I certainly see this quote as one of the myths about Wittgenstein, if you don’t think that the opinions and questions of Ray Monk imposed and I quoted here.

Let me dissect Ray Monk’s rather extreme words to describe opinions on several fields of study in Wittgenstein’s time. The two compound words are: transparently spurious, obvious nonsense, which were used to show the possible Wittgenstein’s understanding of scientific biology and epistemology. The other fields are known as primitive psychology and odious ethical prescriptions. To me with reading of Tractatus of Logico-Philosophicus, I understand Wittgenstein’s opinions all but one in scientific biology. Mr. Monk attribute the opinions to the influence of Weininger on Wittgenstein. Therefore, he used pages to describe Weininger’s opinions. Although Weininger was popular — Otto Weininger (1880 – 1903) was an Austrian philosopher who lived in the Austro-Hungarian Empire. In 1903, he published the book, Sex and Character, which gained popularity after his suicide at the age of 23 –it is not necessary that Wittgenstein, who were 9 years younger than Weininger, was agree with his opinions in Sex and Character. Moreover, if one reads Tractatus, the only publication of Wittgenstein, I doubt that one can see the opinions of Wittgenstein by Ray Monk that I quoted above. At least, I did not see any odious ethical prescriptions in Tractatus, but rather get the clear sense of the delimiter between study of philosophy and natural sciences, of which psychology is included. To me, the most genius presentation of the world view in Tractatus is Wittgenstein’s systemic description of the world and the language, (the expression of thoughts, ) the relation between mathematics and logic, and what is the difference between philosophy and natural sciences. I wonder what is Mr. Monk’s view of epistemology in Tractatus?

Now, back to the subject of reading, Reading is the most informative activity for individuals to get sense of the world we live in, given that it is one of the most complex actions, and that it is hard to measure the results of reading objectively. That is the reason in Monk’s question — what did he learn from it? However, it was Monk’s rhetorical question in the context.

Following the train of thought on Weininger, I quoted Monk here: “So much so, that there is reason to believe that of all the books he read in adolescence, Weininger’s is the one that had the greatest and most lasting impact on his outlook.”(chapter one，page 25)

What makes Ray Monk say so?

In my analysis, it is the misunderstanding of Monk about reading, the most reflective intellect activities of human beings, our faculty of taking the world and our understanding of the world we live in.

Another example of Ray Monk’s misunderstanding of reading is in the text (chapter one, page 26.)

“The works by scientists which he read as a teenager — Heinrich Hertz’s Principles of Mechanics, and Ludwig Boltzmann’s Populare Schriften — suggest an interest, not in mechanical engineering, nor even, especially, in theoretical physics, but rather in the philosophy of science.” Both Hertz and Boltzmann were great scientists during Wittgenstein’s time, and both were idealists if we divided philosophical thinking to the two camps, idealists and empiricists. Monk believed that the two scientists rooted Wittgenstein’s idealist view. The misunderstanding of reading by Monk is, allowing me to use an idiom description, is that he put the cart before the horse. Indeed, reading is more, more than education in the form of schooling. All knowledge begins with experience, but it is not sufficient that all knowledge arises from experience of reading.

Why should one tell the truth if it’s to one’s advantage to tell a lie?

When Wittgenstein was eight or nine, this question jumped to his mind. Such is the question and reflects one’s thought in profundity.

In the book Ludwig Wittgenstein, The Duty of Genius, (Penguin books, 1990) the author Ray Monk opened the biography on Wittgenstein with the above anecdote, and then made his comparison between Bertrand Russell and Wittgenstein in the difference of pursuing research in philosophy.

For Russell, philosophy was to find certainty where doubts were bothered him. On the other hand, philosophy came to Wittgenstein, (Russell’s protege) not he to philosophy. The key to understand the difference is in one’s natural tendency of thinking deeply and broadly.

The next worthy of mentioning incidence that reflected in Wittgenstein’s communication with his sister was also in page one. Speculating Wittgenstein’s comfortableness with being a philosopher, or not at all, Mr. Monk pointed out the fact that, once his sister called him a great philosopher in a letter to him, Wittgenstein corrected her by writing back “call me a truth-seeker, and I will be satisfied.” Mr. Monk continued with his own analysis: “this points not to a change of opinion, but to change of character.”

Philosophers are truth-seekers, indeed. Wittgenstein did the excellent writing about his conviction of what philosophy is.

Thinking is in every human being, thinking profoundly is our tendency encoded in the faculty of our mind, just as the language ability in us is like an organ within us where we have the tendency of using language to speak clearly and logically, even though not everyone is thinking at the same level and/or the same degree of broadness.

Philosophical thinking is resulted in anyone who thinks deeply and broadly. It doesn’t matter who is thinking and in which profession a thinker is. That’s my explanation to the claim by Mr. Monk that “a transformation [of Wittgenstein] that would make philosophy itself unnecessary. ”

Other transformations Mr. Monk mentioned about Wittgenstein were his personality/character changes. For example for his Cambridge years as professor, he was perceived as compelling, uncompromising, dominating personality whereas during his childhood, he was a sweet and compliant, eager to please, willing to conform, even if that could make him compromise the truth. Wasn’t he a typical nice boy? Wasn’t he an expected good professor as well?