This piece is the prerequisite to Thought and Language, written on Feb. 5, 2021, in which I assumed that human language is logic, even though an individual use of human language may not be always logical. Wittgenstein has it declared in his preface of Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus: The book deals with the problems of philosophy and shows, as I believe, that the method of formulating these problems rests on the misunderstanding of the logic of our language. I have made his point without an direct quote in my writing in Metaphysics, written on Feb. 1, 2021. This writing, plus the two, Metaphysics and Thought and Language, three pieces together, may provide a foundation to the human understanding; that’s my aim.
Human language is unique in this world because it is logic. Further, the levels of understanding of the logic in our language reflect our metaphysics. Wittgenstein had this point clear in his first philosophical treaty, Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus. Let us look at them in details.
We make to ourselves pictures of facts. (2.1)
Facts are objective in the natural world. We use our sense and experience to describe facts. Pictures are apparatus to do so.
The picture represents the facts in logical space, the existence and nonexistence of atomic facts. (2.11)
The facts in logical space are the world. (1.13) The world divides into facts. (1.2)
Depending on whoever is picturing the facts in logical space, it may not always existence, such as “the sun will rise tomorrow.” The picture is a model of reality. (2.12) Yes, only if the picture is the facts in logical space. The picture consists in the fact that its elements are combined with one another in a definite way. (2.14) Yes, only if the picture is an atomic fact. What is the case, the fact, is the existence of atomic facts. (2) An atomic fact is a combination of objects (entities, things). (2.01) It is essential to a thing that it can be a constituent part of an atomic fact. (2.011)
In logic nothing is accidental: if a thing can occur in an atomic fact the possibility of that atomic fact must already be prejudged in the thing. (2.012) It would , so to speak, appear as an accident, when to a thing that could exist alone on its own account, subsequently a state of affairs could be made to fit. If things can occur in atomic facts, this possibility must already lie in them. (A logical entity cannot be merely possible. Logic treats of every possibility, and all possibilities are its facts.) Just as we cannot think of spatial objects at all apart from space, or temporal object apart from the possibility of its connection with other things. If I can think of a object in the context of an atomic fact, I cannot think of it apart from the possibility of this context. (2.0121)
In Facts and Opinions according to Wittgenstein, I have explained his statements, now repeating as follows.
That the sun will rise tomorrow, is a hypothesis; and that means that we do not know whether it will rise. (6.36311) In theory, theory and practice are the same; in practice, they are different. (Yogi Berra 1925-2015) To test whether a theory is true or not, only is it done in practice. When we know the truth that the sun rises everyday, we understand the logical necessity in nature—the rise of the sun generally. Specifically, we must see it at the predicted time and space for its rising. Before then, it is only the possibility of this context (2.0121) for that the sun will rise is not an essential thing to an atomic fact, (2.011) which has encompassed our knowledge of the sun system.
Again, I am trying to express the relation between language and logic to those who have themselves thought the thoughts already. It is therefore not a textbook, by repeating what Wittgenstein has said in his preface of the Tactutas.
Note:
To make my emphasis the quotes of Wittgenstein above in bold and italic are from Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, translated by C.K. Ogden in
Major works, Selected Philosophical Writings, Ludwig Wittgenstein, by HapperCollins Publishers, Copyright 2009